Aboriginal affairs: Monologue or dialogue? by Castejon, Vanessa
Western University
Scholarship@Western
Aboriginal Policy Research Consortium International (APRCi)
5-18-2009
Aboriginal affairs: Monologue or dialogue?
Vanessa Castejon
Université Paris III
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Aboriginal Affairs: Monologue or Dialogue?
Vanessa Castejon
On January 26 2002, the thirtieth anniversary of the creation of the first Aboriginal
tent embassy was celebrated. In 1972 the tent embassy emerged from the Black
Power movement as a manifestation of the call for recognition of Aboriginal
sovereignty and the right to self-determination. These claims have been raised
continually by some prominent Aboriginal activists, but the main answer given by
the government has been the creation of Aboriginal policies and sections for
Aboriginal people within the Australian political system. The government, by
different means, has brought Aboriginal activists within the system and has
diverted attention from their aspirations. What I would like to point out in this
article is that the government has answered claims for a dialogue with an imposed
monologue. I would also like to stress that some activists have found ways to take
advantage of the circumstances imposed upon them and have developed a
dialogue from within governmental institutions. I d o not pretend to give a full
description of the different means used by Aboriginal people to gain recognition
of their rights; I aim only to give an account of some strategies utilised by
Indigenous Australians in their fight against political marginalisation.
In 1972, the first response of the government to Aboriginal political claims was
radical: the police simply expelled the Aboriginal embassy from the lawn of what
is now old Parliament House. This action generated much publicity for the
Aboriginal cause. The following answers to Indigenous political claims were more
moderate and, above all, less visible. In 1973, the Whitlam government used some
of the rhetoric of the embassy protests when introducing what was called the self-
determination policy. Prime minister Whitlam declared: 'The basic object of my
Government's policy is to restore to the Aboriginal people of Australia their power
of self-determination in economic, social and political affairs'.1 The self-
determination policy was in fact self-management; far from what was asked for by
Aboriginal activists, as it meant only greater participation in Aboriginal policy as
defined by the government and not what is meant by the international definition
of self-determination, which is the right to exercise a free political choice.
The first 'Aboriginal' governmental institutions
Not only did the government determine Aboriginal policy, it also answered claims
for political independence by offering a determinate place to Aboriginal people
within the Australian political system. In 1973 the Department of Aboriginal
Affairs, composed of non-Aboriginal people, was created to administrate the
money allocated to the governance of Indigenous Australians. Another
organisation was born the same year, created by Gordon Bryant, then minister for
Aboriginal Affairs. It was the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee
(NACC). The NACC was elected by Aboriginal people and was supposed to assist
the Department of Aboriginal Affairs. Unfotunately, the Department considered
the NACC as a rival. After a report on the organisation in 1976,2 it was dismantled
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y [
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
W
est
ern
 O
nta
rio
] a
t 0
7:1
0 0
9 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
2 
Country
and replaced by the National Aboriginal Conference (NAC). No negotiation was
proposed to the place offered to Aboriginal people within the political system. If
we consider Michael Dodson's declaration that 'Self-determination is to peoples
what freedom is to individuals ... the very basis of their existence', then the
negation of this right, manifest in the inclusion of Aboriginal activists within the
system, can be considered as réclusion. The government answered claims to
autonomy by political integration.
In the 1970s and 1980s, some Aboriginal people entered the political system,
firstly the NACC and later the NAC, to attempt to change things from within.
They tried to negotiate a compromise between the agenda of the government and
that of Aboriginal bodies. An agreement, also called Makarratta, was asked for. In
1984, when the NAC became more virulent about the need for an agreement, it
was simply dismantled with internal dysfunction offered as a rationale.3 No
Aboriginal governmental institution was established to replace the NAC during
the 1980s. At that time, with the coming of the celebrations of the bicentenary of
federation, variously regarded as the discovery of Australia or the beginning of
invasion, protests and claims became stronger. Promises were made by the
government to appease the activists before the celebrations: Prime minister Bob
Hawke promised a treaty but was defeated by his government. He had to recant
his words and instead promise an 'agreement'. The difference between a treaty
and an agreement is that an agreement can be made between two groups in the
same country while a treaty was said to imply a possible recognition of
sovereignty, as it is supposed to be made on an equal footing.
The present institutions
At the beginning of the 1990s, the government created two new 'Aboriginal'
agencies, partly as a response to Aboriginal claims: the Australian and Torres
Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) and the Council for Aboriginal
Reconciliation (CAR). ATSIC was the first to be created, in 1990, and was
supposed to be a truly representative Aboriginal body in the Australian political
system. ATSIC is said to be an independent body and is even considered as a non-
governmental organisation by the United Nations. Yet there seems to be suspicion
surrounding ATSIC's image of independence, mainly because the organisation is
resourced and controlled by the government. For example, in the early days of the
institution, when the minister for Aboriginal affairs, Robert Tickner, said 'I have
no power anymore, it's now ATSIC's responsibility', Aboriginal activist Gary
Foley said that it was like a ventriloquist saying that the puppet was controlling
the show.4 Among non-Aboriginal people also ATSIC is said to be too closely
aligned with the government. During the ATSIC pre-election period in 2002,
shadow minister for Aboriginal affairs Carmen Lawrence said that ATSIC
president Geoff Clark was 'a little close to government' and she added 'that's what
worries me about ATSIC at the moment'.5 Geoff Clark answered: 'What do people
expect — Geoff Clark the bomb thrower?' Geoff Clark has tried to negotiate with
the government on Indigenous issues, following the government's policy of
'practical reconciliation'. At the same time, he has pushed ATSIC's political
agenda since his election in 1999. Geoff Clark describes himself as a 'progressive
thinker', but is still the vice-president of the Aboriginal Provisional Government,
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Vanessa Castejon
which is radical in its declarations. Geoff Clark has been described as a disguised
moderate by some Aboriginal activists, like Robbie Thorpe, who said he was a
Trojan Horse.6
Today ATSIC is not disregarded as a political force, as it was in its nascency.
At that time, some Aboriginal people considered it to be treacherous: Robbie
Thorpe compared it to the Native Police and Murrandoo Yanner called ATSIC
commissioners 'Jacky-Jacky', also referring to 'the Aborigines who sided with the
police, while their people were being massacred or moved'.7 Kevin Gilbert, who
strongly advocated the recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty, even compared
ATSIC to an Aboriginal reserve in government. Aboriginal spokesperson Patrick
Dodson, the first chairperson of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, in his
Wentworth Lecture in 2000, expressed the same feeling:
The reality was that we became slaves of a series of government programs and
policies that continued to determine our political and social lives; a sort of
'assimilation with consultation'. The same bureaucracies that supplied the Native
Protectors provided us with mandarins and field officers.8
Like the previous organisations, ATSIC is used by the government to confine
political activists within a segregated part of the political system. Speaking about
Aboriginal activists in governmental institutions, an Australian journalist
mentioned American president Lyndon Johnson, who said of one of his
bureaucrats: 'I would sooner have him inside the tent spitting out, than outside the
tent spitting in'.9 This could, indeed, apply to the confinement of Aboriginal
activists within governmental institutions.
The Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation was created in 1991 in response to
one of the 339 recommendations of the Commission on Aboriginal Death in
Custody. CAR was, in a way, an answer to Aboriginal claims for a treaty, as it was
supposed to establish a 'document' or 'documents' of reconciliation. CAR was in
fact only a means to improve the relations between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
people without having to define the place of each group within the Australian
system. CAR was focused on building a common identity on the acknowledgment
of the past conflict rather than acknowledging different identities to imagine
common aspirations. After ten years of reconciliation, Geoff Clark said:
Reconciliation helped to clarify amongst ourselves what it was that we were after.
It helped to clarify amongst the non-Aboriginal community the level of ignorance
and the level of non-understanding.10
Reconciliation put an end to the Great Australian Silence,11 but no words were
spoken for the future. The non-Aboriginal population was asked to believe that
reconciliation was a priority for Aboriginal people when Aboriginal people
involved in the fight for political rights seem to have considered it, above all, as a
priority for non-Aboriginal people. Geoff Clark spoke about Reconciliation as a
'Whitefella's business'12 and Gary Foley mentioned a 'non-indigenous concept'.13
Some said that it was too early to get these two groups together. Aboriginal radical
activist Isabell Coe said: 'They speak about Reconciliation, when they should
speak about ending the war'.14 Some, indeed, asked for conciliation before
reconciliation. A conciliation, or a 'peace process' in the words of Isabell Coe,
could have been a treaty.
29
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y [
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
W
est
ern
 O
nta
rio
] a
t 0
7:1
0 0
9 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
2 
Country
Reconciliation was in fact a social answer to a political claim. It was only used
during the ten-year lifespan of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation as a
channel for Aboriginal claims. For Les Malezer, international representative for
the Foundation for Aboriginal and Islander Research Action (FAIRA),15
reconciliation is something Indigenous people did not ask for. One of his recent
essays is entitled 'Reconciliation? Sounds ok but "no", thanks!' This essay ends
up with those words: 'Forget about Reconciliation, I never asked for it. I want a
treaty'.16 For Geoff Clark also, 'Reconciliation was a distraction from the treaty
debate and we wasted ten years'.17 According to Kevin Gilbert, the position in
which the government has placed Aboriginal people through reconciliation is one
of victim,18 not of a sovereign people, and he rejects it. Patrick Dodson, in another
context said, 'we are still chained to our thinking and continue to seek the station
manager's nod of approval'.19 For many Aboriginal activists, reconciliation seems
to be evidence of the government's disregard of Aboriginal voices, or that it is
carefully selecting the ones listened to.
Reconciliation has been built upon a myth of peace. Aboriginal governmental
institutions, and many other non-Aboriginal decisions on Indigenous issues, are
supposed to have been the pillars of the peace process and reconciliation is
presented as their natural successor. Reconciliation even celebrates this 'peace'.
For example, the beginning of Reconciliation Week is on May 27, the anniversary
of the 1967 referendum, and its last day is on June 3, the day of the Mabo decision.
The referendum participated in the myth created by the government to pretend that
it was working for Aboriginal people. The myth has taken such proportions that
many Australians think that the referendum gave Aboriginal people Australian
citizenship the right to vote.20 For example, Kim Beazley, the former leader of the
Labor Party in 2000 said that 'It led to true citizenship and voting rights for many
of our Indigenous people'.21 In fact, the referendum only allowed Aboriginal
people to be counted in the census and to be under the legislation of the federal
government. The government calls the referendum (or the myth born from the
referendum) the first step to reconciliation.22 For Gary Foley, 'many Kooris23
today feel that we should not get too excited about reconciliation as it is a concept
that will deliver as little in terms of land and economic justice to Aboriginal
peoples as what the Referendum did'.24 The myth has been used to pretend that
peace between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people was already a fact, that
Australia was a 'lucky country' which could offer 'a fair go for all'. The myth was
used to pretend that it was the beginning of a series of governmental measures to
'help' Aboriginal people. These measures included the creation of the Aboriginal
governmental institutions.
The institutions created by the government to show that Aboriginal people
were taking part in the decision making process were imposed on Aboriginal
people and what was supposed to be a means of creating political dialogue turned
out to be an imposed monologue. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Aboriginal
activists have found various means to redirect the debate towards their own
aspirations. Some entered the government-created institutions and managed to
influence them in support of Aboriginal political rights. For example, ATSIC is
now supporting a treaty under the influence of chairman Geoff Clark, who is the
first ATSIC president to be elected. ATSIC has established a National Treaty
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Support Group and a National 'think tank' to work on the treaty issue. It is also
organising consultations of Aboriginal people on that topic. Geoff Clark has also,
with the support of a few other members of the Council for Aboriginal
Reconciliation, managed to get the Council to include the treaty issue in its final
recommendations in December 2000.1 would like to underline that reconciliation
was proposed as an answer to treaty claims at the end of the 1980s, and that the
conclusion of CAR'S ten years of work on reconciliation was that a treaty was
needed. The government used the Council to redirect Aboriginal claims, but when
claims for a treaty began to resurface, this time inside the institution, the
government expressed its disapproval. The government seems to have killed the
policy it put in place because it saw it slipping from its hands. On August 29 2002,
after a motion introduced by the only Aboriginal senator, Aden Ridgeway, an
inquiry was launched to investigate the governments progress towards
reconciliation. In a paper given last year at the European Association for Studies
on Australia (EASA) conference in Lecce, Italy, I argued that the means used by
the Australian government against Aboriginal political aspirations was close to
political apartheid. I would say that the government's tendency to manage
Indigenous issues solely within Aboriginal Affairs is, again, close to political
apartheid.
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